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INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK
MARKET THIRTY YEARS LATER
Richard W. Paintert
In 1966, Henry Manne argued that insider trading does not harm
investors and can indeed be an efficient way of compensating insiders
when they enhance an issuer's stock price.1 If Marine's arguments
were right, then the SEC's initiative to regulate insider trading under
section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities Act, which had begun in earnest
with proceedings against Cady, Roberts & Co. in 1961, was wrong.
The stakes were high, particularly for the SEC as it embarked on this
new field of regulation, and the reaction to Marine's arguments from
legal academics was overwhelmingly critical.3
Regardless of whether insider trading should in fact be prohib-
ited, Manne did everyone--even proponents of insider trading regu-
lation-a service by making his arguments so early in the debate over
insider trading and by insisting that his arguments be answered not
with platitudes, but with rigorous economic analysis of the financial
markets. Over twenty years later, Jon Macey and David Haddock
answered this call by identifying a convincing rationale for restric-
tions on insider trading: protecting property rights to information.4
Macey and Haddock, however, argued that property rights to invest-
ment information, like other property rights, are best protected by de-
fault rules rather than by immutable rules.5 Convincing economic
t Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law.
1 See HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 138-41 (1966)
(arguing that insider trading may be appropriate compensation for individual entrepreneurs to
reward their contributions to building a successful corporation).
2 In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
3 See, e.g., Roy A. Schotland, Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply to Manne, Insider Trading
and the Stock Market, 53 VA. L REv. 1425 (1967) (challenging Manne's defense of insider
trading).
4 See David D. Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, A Coasian Model of Insider Trading, 80
Nw. U. L REV. 1449 (1986) (applying Coase's observation that, in the absence of transaction
costs, contracting parties will reach an "efficient allocation of property rights" to the intrafirm
relationship between shareholders and insider employees); see also JONATHAN R. MACEY,
INSIDER TRADING: ECONOMICS, POLITICS AND POLICY 67 (1991) (arguing that "the only con-
ceivable justification for banning insider trading is that such trading involves the theft of valu-
able corporate property from its rightful owner").
5 See MACEY, supra note 4, at 5 ("Because no uniform legal rule concerning insider
trading would benefit all firms, individual firms should be able to allocate for themselves the
rights to trade on the privileged inside information they legitimately possess. Frms should be
able to make any allocation they desire, including one that gives such rights to corporate insid-
ers."); see also Haddock & Macey, supra note 4, at 1449-50 ("[T]he nature of [the stock-
305
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAWREVIEW
arguments thus still must be made to support the immutable rules that
are enforced with increasing vigor now that the SEC's statutory man-
date to regulate insider trading is clear.
6
Jon Macey's essay in this Symposium makes a convincing case
that some investors, particularly "price sensitive" investors, could
bear the cost of allowing insiders to trade with an informational ad-
vantage.7 Macey also recognizes that insider trading opportunities
could create perverse incentives for corporate managers which de-
crease shareholder wealth.8 Macey also points out, however, that in-
siders contribute to pricing efficiency and may provide other benefits
to the securities markets. 9 Ultimately, these costs and benefits of in-
sider trading are likely to be reflected in an issuer's cost of capital. If
so, it is arguably appropriate for the issuer to decide whether restric-
tions on insider trading should apply, and if so, how broad those re-
strictions should be. The default rule may thus still be preferable to
the immutable rule.
In "classical" insider trading cases, where the issuer has an iden-
tifiable property right to most non-public investment information
material to the issuer's securities, Macey's and Haddock's property
rights to information theory articulates a legal and economic justifi-
cation for insider trading regulation. In "misappropriation" theory
cases, the connection between the legal property right to information
and the economic justification for insider trading regulation, if any, is
more tenuous. Still, at least in circumstances in which the third per-
son owner of information is a participant in the securities markets (for
example, a prospective tender offeror), that person most likely will
bear the costs of insider trading on the information and should be al-
lowed to decide how that information can be used.
As Macey points out, the courts have embraced both classical
and misappropriation theories of insider trading that embody an ap-
proach based on property rights to information. This commentator
holder/insider] relationship acts as an incentive to both outside shareholders and insiders to
allocate the right to trade on inside information to the group that values it most highly.").
6 See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997) (approving the SEC's misappro-
priation theory of insider trading). The parameters of the misappropriation theory approved of
by the Court, however, are not so clear. See Richard W. Painter, Kimberly Krawiec, & Cynthia
Williams, Don't Ask, Just Tell: Insider Trading After United States v. O'Hagan, 84 VA. L. REV.
153, 188-91 (1998) (pointing out ambiguities in the O'Hagan opinion, particularly with respect
to the type of fiduciary relationship required to create a duty to disclose or refrain from trading).
7 See Jonathan R. Macey, Securities Trading:A Contractual Perspective, 50 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 269, 273-74 (1999) (discussing the effect on "price-function traders" of permitting
insider trading).
8 See id. at 277-78 (arguing that insider trading may impede market efficiency by encour-
aging insiders to withhold information that would otherwise be made public so that they may
first trade upon the non-public information).
9 See id. at 275-77.
10 See id. at 284-287 (noting the regulatory paradigm shift after Chiarella v. United States,
445 U.S. 222 (1980)).
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is less impressed than Macey with Supreme Court jurisprudence in
this area, and remains concerned that the misappropriation theory
protects property rights in information that have little or nothing to do
with securities markets or the purposes of the securities laws. 11
Nonetheless, Macey correctly identifies a property-rights based com-
mon theme in the Court's insider trading cases. In sum, Manne posed
a question (why insider trading should be illegal, if at all) that has
been answered at least in part by a property rights to information the-
ory. The Court, with mixed results, has incorporated this property
rights theory into its interpretation of the SEC's power to regulate
insider trading under the 1934 Act.
I. COUNTING CARDS IN A CASINO
The analogy between a stock market and a casino is in some
ways an apt one. Investors, like gamblers, take risks with their money
by betting that certain events will or will not occur. Investors, like
gamblers, weigh possible returns against the probability that these
returns will occur and generally insist that the payoff from winning be
great if the probability of winning is small. Investors, like gamblers,
choose either relatively safe bets that pay a winner relatively little or
more risky bets that pay a winner more. Investors, like gamblers, can
diversify by spreading their bets around and betting on a range of
events rather than a single event.
There are, however, important differences between a stock mar-
ket and a casino. Virtually every casino expects to take something for
"the house" each time a bet is made (the expected return for the gam-
bler is negative and the expected return for the house is positive). In
games that do not involve skill (e.g., the roulette wheel), a gambler
inevitably will lose money if she plays long enough. In games that
involve skill, gamblers as a whole will lose, although some may come
out ahead. Casinos that give a positive expected return to their cus-
tomers do not stay in business for very long.
The stock market of course is different; although brokers, market
makers, and other intermediaries take their share of investors' profits,
there is no "house" that skims so much from the market that the in-
vestor is likely to leave the market with less money than she started
with. Indeed, most investors in the stock market make money over
time, and diversified investors who do not incur the transaction costs
of excessive trading, in the long run are almost certain to share in
11 See Painter et al., supra note 6, at 190 (arguing that "a serious shortcoming of the mis-
appropriation theory [is that] [i]nsider trading liability turns not on effects on the marketplace or
on potential damage to selling or purchasing shareholders, but rather on a duty owed to the
source of the information, regardless of whether that source is a buyer or seller of securities or
even a market participant at all").
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these gains. Unlike gambling at a card table or roulette wheel, gam-
bling with investment capital has a positive expected return.
Card counters are not popular in casinos. If caught, card count-
ers are usually ejected or required to play other games where their
informational advantage cannot be used (perhaps craps or roulette). If
successful, card counters can beat the house over time, and by in-
creasing the size of their bets, they can substantially erode a casino's
profits. The casino could, of course, tolerate a few card counters and
make up for its losses by changing the payoffs in its own favor, but
doing so might cause other gamblers to take their business elsewhere.
The money that the card counter takes home must come from some-
where, and either the house, the other gamblers, or both will pay for
his having a seat at the table.
The insider trader is in some ways like the card counter; she
plays with an informational advantage that other investors do not
have. 12 If she is allowed to play, the money she takes home because
of her informational advantage must come from somewhere. This
"somewhere" is most likely other investors in the stock market, al-
though not necessarily the persons she trades with. Jon Macey, in his
essay, correctly identifies the price-sensitive trader as the person most
likely to bear the costs of the insider's informational advantages.
13
To the extent specialists incur costs from trading with insiders, they
are likely to pass at least some of the costs on to other investors-
particularly investors who trade frequently-by increasing their bid-
ask spreads. 14 Because mutual funds and pension funds often are
price-sensitive investors, and trade frequently, these costs are likely to
be spread around among a great many investors rather than being
born by a few.
Macey and Manne point out, however, that the insider trader
brings value to the market in return for her profits. Unlike the card
counter, whose bets are unlikely to systematically influence the bets
of other gamblers, the insider trader makes market prices more accu-
rately reflect all available information (strong market efficiency in-
stead of the semi-strong efficiency that prevails in the absence of in-
sider trading). Other investors are more likely to pay an "accurate"
price for a security when insiders trade than when they do not. On the
other hand, insiders who cause an issuer to delay public announce-
ment of important news can decrease market efficiency. Furthermore,
to the extent price sensitive investors fear losses to insiders and con-
sequently switch to buy and hold strategies or index funds, price ac-
12 The card counter, of course, uses only her own mental facilities (memory) to create the
information whereas the insider trader uses externally created information.
13 See Macey, supra note 7, at 274.
14 See id. at 278.
308 [Vol. 50:305
19991 INSIDER TRADING AND THE MARKET THIRTY YEARS LATER 309
curacy may suffer from the departure from the market of investors
whose trades help make the market efficient.
Macey also takes up Manne's argument that insider traders may
increase the total amount of money available for distribution among
all investors. Total wealth will increase if insiders are encouraged by
the possibility of insider tradinq profits to create value-enhancing
projects that increase stock price. 5 On the other hand, insider trading
profits may bear relatively little resemblance to the value added to an
issuer's stock price by the insider, and indeed insiders who trade on
bad news may be getting compensated for their failures rather than
their successes.
To this commentator, the verdict on whether the insider trader
brings more value to the table than she takes away in profits is mixed.
Some insider traders create more value than they take for themselves
(for example, the scientist who might be inspired by insider trading
profits to develop a new drug for a drug company), but many others
take away profits that far exceed the value that they add. Although
the cost of detecting insider trading and enforcing insider trading
regulations must be taken into account, non-insiders would probably
still prefer to invest in a market in which other investors did not trade
on inside information.
This being said, the fact that the costs and benefits of insider
trading may weigh differently in different situations is an argument in
favor of allowing issuers to opt out of insider trading regulation. Al-
ternatively, the locus of regulation could be the stock exchanges, and
issuers could choose their regulatory regime by choosing the ex-
change on which their securities are listed. This author differs from
Manne and believes that the majority of issuers would choose not to
allow insider trading. In most circumstances, shareholders would not
tolerate its costs and would not value its real or perceived benefits.
However, a good argument can be made that issuers (with shareholder
consent) or at least the stock exchanges ultimately should be the ones
to decide, not external regulators. 16
I. EJECTING THE CARD COUNTERS
Most casinos have formal or informal definitions of illicit card
counting and methods for detecting and sanctioning violators. The
Is See Macey, supra note 7, at 279-282 (discussing the theory of insider trading as com-
pensation for entrepreneurial efforts); see also MANNE, supra note 1, at 138-41 (arguing that
insider trading may increase shareholder value because of the presence of additional incentives
for insiders to increase the value of corporate shares).
16 The practical implications of such a regime are significant, however, and need to be
addressed more extensively by proponents of default rules for insider trading. In other words,
despite the theoretical appeal of an opt-out regime, the SEC's immutable rules could practically
be the most efficient means of regulating insider trading.
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SEC, with the support of the courts, has for almost forty years em-
barked on a similar effort to eject persons who trade on informational
advantages from the securities markets. This commentator's most
significant difference with Macey is one of degree in evaluating how
effective and coherent case law has been in this area. In particular,
this commentator remains concerned that Congress has yet to enact a
statutory definition of illegal insider trading and that the SEC has de-
clined to promulgate one by regulation. 17 Reliance on common law
has been misplaced as the Court's insider trading jurisprudence has
evolved very slowly and with considerable inconsistency.
18
This essay can only briefly summarize the observations made by
this commentator and others elsewhere: that the misappropriation
theory as articulated by the Court in O'Hagan is inconsistent with the
Court's prior holdings, particularly in United States v. Chiarella'9 and
Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green;20 that it is difficult to determine
when a fiduciary relationship exists giving rise to a duty not to trade
on information entrusted in the course of that relationship; and that
the misappropriation theory is incomplete in requiring only disclosure
to the principal of the fiduciary's intent to trade rather than the princi-
pal's permission to trade (the "Don't Ask, Just Tell" component). 1
Unanswered questions also remain to be resolved by the Court, such
as whether "warehousing" (purchases of a security by persons tipped
off about a prospective tender offer by a tender offeror who gives the
tippees permission to trade) is within the reach of section 14(e) of the
1934 Act22 (warehousing clearly falls outside of the reach of section
10(b) as interpreted in O'Hagan). Finally, it remains to be seen
whether the SEC is sincere in its intention to kick some of the worst
"cheaters" out of Wall Street's casino: analysts who obtain selective
disclosures in "closed door meetings" and conference calls with man-
agers, who then pass this information to both their employers and
customers.23
17 At the time of this writing, the SEC is considering promulgating some definitions with
respect to the misappropriation theory.
18 See generally, Painter et al., supra note 6 (discussing the Court's insider trading juris-
prudence).
19 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (requiring a duty to disclose and a breach of that duty for there to
be a violation of section 10(b)).
20 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (holding that a mere breach of fiduciary duty cannot be a predicate
for a violation of section 10(b)).
21 See Painter et al., supra note 6, at 178 (noting that the O'Hagan court found that "once
a fiduciary duty and a breach of that duty are found, it is the failure to disclose the breach to the
principal, not the breach itself, that creates liability under Section 10(b)").
2 This question is expressly reserved by the Court in a footnote in O'Hagan. See U.S. v.
O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 672 n.17 ("We leave for another day, when the issue requires decision,
the legitimacy of Rule 14e-3 (a) as applied to 'warehousing'....").
2 At the time of this writing, the SEC has begun expanding enforcement efforts aimed at
such abuses.
[Vol. 50:305
1999] INSIDER TRADING AND THE MARKET THIRTY YEARS LATER 311
IT[. THE LEGACY OF HENRY MANNE
The legacy of Henry Manne in insider trading jurisprudence is
that he dared to ask a question that needed to be asked (why insider
trading should be illegal) and then provided an answer that, even if it
was not entirely correct, needed to be debated. Jonathan Macey,
David Haddock, and some other scholars have taken Manne's argu-
ments seriously, subjected insider trading to rigorous economic analy-
sis, and answered Manne on his own terms.
Unfortunately, the SEC and Congress have for the most part by-
passed this discussion. Although the courts have slowly crafted a
body of case law that embodies some principles that ought to underlie
insider trading regulation-principally protection of property rights to
information-this case law has yet to articulate a clear definition of
illegal insider trading.24 If the discussion that Manne inspired took
place in Washington as well as in the academy, Congress and the SEC
probably would not have decided to legalize insider trading, but the
law would embody some degree of consensus about what type of in-
sider trading is harmful to investors, and why. This consensus would
in turn have provided a clear justification for insider trading regula-
tion in the legislative history and perhaps most important, a definition
in statute or regulation of what type of insider trading, tipping, trading
on misappropriated information, and related conduct is proscribed.
Over thirty years ago, Henry Manne refused to accept the an-
swer that insider trading should be illegal "because it is simply
wrong" or "because it is unfair." Such answers are still inade-
quate, and without better answers, insider trading jurisprudence
will continue to suffer not only from lack of clearly defined rules,
but also from a perceived lack of economic purpose.
24 See Painter et al., supra note 6, at 211-28.

